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"NO HABLO INGLES"
(A Written Agreement plus Consent Equals
Contractual Liability of Illiterates?)
"California has over 3.5 million Spanish surnamed residents. In
consumer dealings, some of these individuals are at a distinct dis-
advantage because of their inability to fully understand English.
This problem is generally compounded because regardless of whe-
ther the dealings are transacted in English or Spanish, the contract
signed by the consumer is inevitably in English. While many
English speaking consumers are able to fathom the meaning of the
contract they sign, no non-English speaking person can." Al Shel-
den, Deputy Attorney General of California.*
"It is a truism that life is more difficult in an English speaking
country for a person who does not speak English . . ." Justice
Mosk of the Supreme Court of California in Guerrero v. Carleson,
9 Cal. 3d 808, 812, 512 P.2d 833, 836, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (1973).
A large segment of the population of California is Spanish speak-
ing. Many of these persons are bilingual, but many more are only
proficient at reading and speaking in their native tongue. Members
of this latter group are often compelled to enter into written agree-
ments which they cannot read since the United States is basically
an English speaking country. An examination of how courts have
dealt with the contractual liability of persons unable to read the
language of a written contract they have signed, and how these per-
sons can be relieved of their contractual liability when held bound,
is the purpose of this article.
PART I
FORMuATION OF CoNTRAcTs IN GENERAL
In the law of formation of contracts two theories have been de-
veloped. One, the objective theory, is based on the principle that a
person's real intent is immaterial in the formation of a contract
and his outward manifestations are alone decisive in determining
if a contract has been formed.' The other theory is contra, follow-
ing the principle that an agreement in intention is necessary to
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not
necessarily of the Attorney General's office.
1. 1 A. Coamns, CoNTRAcTs § 106 (1960).
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create a contract.2 The latter is called the subjective or will theory.
For purposes of this article, the discussion will be concerned with
how and if a person ignorant of the terms of a written contract
due to a language barrier can be bound under either theory.
As a result of these conflicting theories, it is uncertain as to
what is actually required for the formation of a valid contract.
The four elements generally essential to a valid contract are: com-
petent contracting parties, a lawful objective, sufficient considera-
tion, and consent.3 This last element is the only one which can be
disputed solely because a person is unable to read the language of
the contract, and this inquiry will accordingly be limited to the
role of consent or lack thereof in the formation of contracts of illit-
erates.
The essentials of a valid consent are that it be free, mutual and
communicated to each party.4 That mutual consent is necessary
for a contract to be formed is evident; however, what mutual con-
sent actually requires on behalf of the contracting parties, and whe-
ther a "meeting of the minds" is a necessary part of the mutual con-
sent is not altogether clear. For example, mutual assent has been
defined as a "meeting of the minds"5 although a distinction be-
tween the two should be made in view of the fact that it is the gen-
erally accepted rule that mutual assent can exist in the absence of a
real meeting of the minds. 6 This distinction becomes quite evident
when a person, though ignorant of the contents of a writing, is held
to have a mutual consent with the other contracting party as to
those contents. In most jurisdictions these persons have been held
bound to such transactions. 7
The general rule is that, in the absence of fraud, one who signs
a written contract is bound by its terms whether he reads and un-
derstands it or not or whether he can read or not.8
2. Id.
3. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1550 (West 1954); see California State Auto. Ass'n
Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Barrett Garages, 257 Cal. App. 2d 71, 76, 64 Cal. Rptr.
699, 702 (1967), where the court said, "It is essential to the existence of a
contract that there be mutual consent." But cf. Larrus v. First Nat'l Bank
of San Mateo County, 122 Cal. App. 2d 884, 889, 266 P.2d 143, 147 (1954),
where it was said, "It is quite possible for a party to assent to be bound in
accordance with terms of which he is then ignorant ..
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1565 (West 1954).
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 149 (4th ed. 1951):
ASSENT Mutual Assent
The meeting of the minds of both or all the parties to a contract;
the fact that each agrees to all the terms and conditions, in the
same sense and with the same meaning as the others.
6. L. SimPsoN, HANDBOOK OF T=E LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9 (2d ed. 1965).
7. See, 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 607 (1960, Supp. 1971), and cases
dited therein.
8. Cohen v. Santoianni, 330 Mass. 187, 193, 112 N.E.2d 267, 271 (1953).
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Although persons in these situations have been held to contractual
liability, it is clear that there is no real meeting of the minds pres-
ent. This has been unequivocally acknowledged by Professor Cor-
bin in his authoritative treatise:
There is no actual 'meeting of the minds' even though the terms
of the bargain are reduced to writing and signed by both parties,
if one of them did not in fact read or understand the written
terms. 9
Professor Williston, the other recognized authority in the field of
contracts, is in complete agreement with this statement. 10
A person attempting to contract in ignorance of the terms of
the contract, therefore, must be bound under some theory that does
not require an actual meeting of the minds, and consequently in
these situations the objective theory of formation of contracts has
been utilized. Naturally, if a person is in a jurisdiction where the
subjective theory of formation of contracts is still in vogue, then
a lack of a true meeting of the minds would be sufficient grounds
to avoid the contract." As brought out immediately supra, failure
to have knowledge of the terms of a contract does result in a lack
of a meeting of the minds between the proposed contracting par-
ties.'2 Additionally, if a person is held bound by the subjective
theory then he would always be bound in a jurisdiction adhering
to the objective theory. The converse, however, is not always true,
and to fully understand why this is so, a discussion of the compon-
ent parts of the latter theory is required.
In applying the objective theory in cases involving illiterates,
different courts tend to use different rationales. Some cases hold
that a person is presumed to know the contents of a writing and
one's acceptance of such indicates an assent to the terms, whatever
they may be.' 3 Other cases tend to follow an estoppel principle,
basing it on the idea that the illiterate 4 person's conduct in sign-
ing was such as to mislead the other party and the illiterate is now
9. See A. CORBN, supra note 1, at § 107.
10. 1 S. WirLISTON, CONTRACTS § 95A (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1957).
11. Note, Contract Clauses in Fine Print, 63 HiAv. L. REv. 494 (1950).
12. A. CoaN, supra, note 1, at § 107.
13. Stockinger v. Central Natl Ins. Co., 24 Wis. 2d 245, 128 N.W.2d 433
(1964).
14. For want of a better word, illiterate will be used throughout this
article to refer to a person unable to read the language of the Written in-
strument.
estopped to deny his consent to the contract.15 Still other courts
use language to indicate that a person who signs a writing without
first ascertaining the nature of its contents acts in a negligent man-
ner, and one will not be relieved of his own negligent conduct.16
A more detailed discussion of these three rationales will more
clearly bring out the reasoning behind the objective theory.
Presumption of Understanding
There is a presumption that a person who signs an instrument
understands its contents, regardless of the signer's contentions to
the contrary.' 7 Consequently, a person will not be allowed to dis-
affirm a contract by simply contending that it was not read to him
and that he did not understand its provisions.' 8 This presump-
tion has not, however, been applied in all contractual settings.
For example, it has been held that the presumption that a person
has knowledge of the contents of a written contract is not applicable
to insurance contracts because they are usually confusing, long
and very rarely read by the insured.19 Another exception to the
application of this presumption has been held to exist where the
person involved was unable to read the terms of the written con-
tract.20 In McKlosky v. Kobylarz,21 the two complainants were
from Austria and thus were unfamiliar with the English language
used in the written instrument. The court held that notwithstand-
ing the general rule that one will not be permitted to prove that he
did not understand a written contract when his signature appears
thereon, if one is unable to read then he will be permitted to prove
his lack of understanding 'as an exception to the rule. The court,
by holding this way, in effect changed the presumption from a con-
clusive to a rebuttable one.
15. Phelps, The Nature of Mutual Assent in Contracts, 10 OiA. L. REV.
410 (1957); cf. Deering-Milliken & Co. v. Modern-Aire of Hollywood,
231 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1955), where the court held that a contract could
not be formed by estoppel. This statement would seem to be rather liberal
in view of the generally accepted "objective theory." In a case cited by
the Deering court, it was held that a contract can be formed by equitable
estoppel when the party asserting it is ignorant of the true facts. This is
a more accurate view of the law concerning contracts formed by estoppel.
Toms v. Hellman, 115 Cal. App. 74, 1 P.2d 31 (1931).
16. Knox v. Modern Garage & Repair Shop, 68 Cal. App. 583, 229 P. 880
(1924).
17. Stockinger v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 24 Wis. 2d 245, 128 N.W.2d 433.
18. Ideal Loan of New Orleans, Inc. v. Johnson, 218 So. 2d 634 (La.
1969).
19. Laing v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California, 244 Cal. App. 2d 811,
53 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1966).
20. Ciampoli v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 5 N.J. Super. 302,
68 A.2d 883 (1949).
21. 99 N.J. Eq. 202, 132 A. 497 (1926).
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This theory of a presumption is a rule of evidence and is applicable
to the estoppel and negligence rules and is in reality a division of
the two. It is also apparent that this presumption and the deter-
mination as to whether it can be rebutted or not will be of impor-
tance in a subjective as well as objective jurisdiction. If the court
followed the subjective theory, then a failure of the meeting of the
minds would be impossible to prove unless the court allowed this
presumption of understanding to be rebutte. 2
2 It is important
to further realize that many courts do not even mention this pre-
sumption, and allow proof of a lack of knowledge and understand-
ing of a contract's written terms as a matter of course. This is not
to say, however, that the court will consequently hold the contract
unenforceable as a matter of course. As will be seen, knowledge
and understanding of the contract's provisions are not prerequi-
sites to a binding contract under the objective theory.
The negligence and estoppel principles are somewhat interre-
lated and can be better discussed together.
Negligence and Estoppel
Section 70 of the Restatement of Contracts states:
One who makes a written offer which is accepted, or who mani-
fests acceptance of the terms of a writing which he should reason-
ably understand to be an offer or proposed contract is bound by
the contract, though ignorant of the terms of the writing or of its
proper interpretation.
23
Under this rule if a person was aware that a paper was a contract
and signed it, he would be held strictly accountable to the terms of
the contract. It would be irrelevant why he failed to read the con-
22. A similar presumption is that one who signs a written instrument
is presumed to assent to all of its terms. See Security First Nat'l Trust &
Say. Bank v. Loftus, 129 Cal. App. 650, 19 P.2d 297 (1933).
23. In the tentative draft of the RPsTAT aVNT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964), § 70 has been omitted. §§ 20-23 are cited as
sources for material formerly covered by § 70. § 20 states:
Manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange requires that each
party either make a promise or begin or render a performance.
Section 21 in pertinent part states:
3/ The conduct of a party may manifest assent even though he
does not in fact assent. In such cases a resulting contract may
be voidable because of fraud, duress, mistake, or other invalidating
cause.
§§ 22 and 23 are not applicable to this topic.)
tract or otherwise learn its contents. Most courts, however, that
'adhere to the objective theory have developed a principle of negli-
gence rather than following the Restatement's theory of strict lia-
bility to determine if a person should be bound to a contract. The
negligence theory is possibly best stated by a California court which
has said:
... a person is bound by the printed contractual provisions of an
instrument which he accepts delivery of if, as an ordinary prudent
man, he could and should have read such provisions.24
This holding seems to imply an exception applicable to the situa-
tion where a person is unable to read. However, Schmidt v. Be-
kins Van & Storage CO.25 did deal with that situation and applied
substantially the same rule. The Schmidt court held that a person
under a language disability is still required to exercise the care of
a reasonable man before entering into written transactions, and as a
reasonable man he is under a duty to have the instrument read to
him before he executes it or "assents" to the agreement. 26 His fail-
ure to do this is an indication of negligence on his part and the con-
tract can be held binding on him regardless of his lack of real as-
sent.
It can be recognized, therefore, that as a primary rule one who is
unable to read is under a legal duty to have someone read the docu-
ment to him before he enters into the proposed agreement.27 His
failure to so act can result in his being presumed to assent to all
the terms of the agreement. 28 There are exceptions to most rules,
however, and there are exceptions to this one. Negligence is a flex-
ible standard, and what is held to be negligence under one set of cir-
cumstances will perhaps not be considered negligence under an-
other. Whether or not failure to ascertain the contents of a writing
prior to signing is negligent conduct will depend largely on the
facts of each particular case.
29
In Dorrity v. Greater Durham Building & Loan Ass'n.,30 it was
ruled that failure to read an agreement prior to its execution was
not negligence per se where the person involved was illiterate.
The court in Dorrity did not touch on the alternative duty of pro-
24. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Barrett Garages,
257 Cal. App. 2d 71, 76, 64 Cal. Rptr. 699, 703 (1967).
25. 27 Cal. App. 667, 155 P. 647 (1915).
26. Id. at 670, 155 P. at 648.
27. Roberd v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 490 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973).
28. Boylan v. Hot Springs R.R., 132 U.S. 146 (1889).
29. California Trust Co. v. Cohn, 214 Cal. 619, 7 P.2d 297 (1932).
30. 204 N.C. 698, 169 S.E. 640 (1933).
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curing someone to read the instrument to the intended signer.
Nonetheless, that alternative duty does exist in most cases, and it
will be the job for the trier of fact to determine whether under
the circumstances involved, the signer was negligent in failing to
fulfill this duty. To determine his negligence, the following cir-
cumstances should be considered relevant: For one, the presence
or absence of any third person who might be called upon to read
and explain the instrument to him; secondly, the apparent neces-
sity to act without delay and the consequential lack of time to com-
ply with the duty; a third very important consideration is whether
any representations were made concerning the contents of the writ-
ing and the identity of the person making them. Obviously, if no
representations are made, then the illiterate person's conduct in
failing to obtain a reading could be considered inexcusable, since
he is entering into a written agreement without any knowledge of
its terms.31 This in fact would tend to border on reckless conduct.
On the other hand, if the opposing party or a third person had dis-
cussed the contents of the writing and the one unable to read
had a justifiable right to rely on this person he would generally
not be held negligent in failing to have the contract read to him
verbatim.32 In Grimsley v. Singletary,33 the court described their
exception to the rule that failure to discover the meaning of a con-
tract's language is negligence:
He (the illiterate) may ordinarily rely upon representation of the
other party as to what the instrument is or as to what it contains;
and his mere failure to request the other party or some one [sic]
else to read it to him will not generally be such negligence as will
make the instrument binding upon him.34
The Grimsley court seemed to hold that when the representations
are made by the opposing party, the illiterate party can justifiably
rely even in the absence of a confidential relationship. Many
courts, however, apply a stricter rule of justifiable reliance than
the Grimsley court.3 5
31. Robertson v. Panlos, 208 Ga. 116, 65 S.E.2d 400 (1951); Smith v.
Agan, 111 Ga. App. 536, 142 S.E.2d 291 (1965).
32. Cole v. Cates, 113 Ga. App. 540, 149 S.E.2d 165 (1966).
33. 133 Ga. 56, 65,S.E. 92 (1909).
34. Id. at 58, 65 S.E. at 93.
35. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Sutherland, 187- Kan. 599, 358 P.2d 776
(1961). (The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the illiterate's failure
Some courts have taken the duty of due care off of the person
unable to read, and in place of it have required the other party to
read and fully inform the illiterate party of the nature of the instru-
ment.3 6 Of course, before this affirmative duty could apply the
other party would have to be aware of the illiterate's handicap.37
In this setting the relationship of the estoppel and negligence
principles becomes evident. By signing a contract, a person mani-
fests his assent and the other party thus believes the former has
knowledge of and is agreeing to all the terms and the latter thereby
relies.38 Negligence is also related to this theory of estoppel in that
a person failing to ascertain the terms of the contract may be negli-
gent and thereby be estopped from avoiding it on the ground of not
understanding its provisions. His negligence is what has misled
the other party into believing he understood the writing. It log-
ically follows that if one party is aware of the other's illiteracy
then the estoppel principle would have no application because he
would not be misled. Professors Corbin and Williston both con-
cur with regard to this.39 In this case the illiterate party could only
be held because of his negligence. Thus, it can be seen that even
though the two theories are interrelated, they can operate inde-
pendently in the formation of a contract under the objective
theory.
FORmATnON OF CONTRACTS IX CALIFORNIA
A contract is indeed the result of objective manifestations of the
parties. If those manifestations are sufficient, the parties' sub-
jective intentions or beliefs are wholly immaterial.40
This, the objective theory, is not without competition in Cali-
fornia, for many California courts use language indicating that a
"meeting of the minds" is necessary for a valid contract.41 By sta-
tute, California defines mutual consent as the parties all agreeing
"upon the same thing in the same sense. ' 42 This requirement is
limited by further language in the statute indicating that in inter-
to procure a reliable person to read and explain the instrument to him
constituted gross negligence.)
36. Spitze v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 75 Md. 162, 23 A. 307 (1892); Miller
v. Spokane Int'l Ry., 82 Wash. 170, 143 P. 981 (1914).
37. Id.
38. See Phelps, supra note 15.
39. See A. Corny, supra note 1, at § 107; S. WLLisTox, supra note 10,
at § 35.
40. Fowler v. Security-First Nat'1 Bank, 146 Cal. App. 2d 37, 47, 303 P.2d
565, 571 (1956).
41. See, e.g., Bowman v. Victor, 83 Cal. App. 2d 693, 189 P.2d 876 (1948).
42. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1580 (West 1954).
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pretation of contracts, unexpressed intentions are immaterial.48
Many California courts seem to have utilized this limitation in con-
struing this code section as not requiring a meeting of the minds
in the formation as well as interpretation of contracts. 44 A dis-
tinction should be drawn, however, with respect to formation and
interpretation. Obviously, if the legislature thought that unex-
pressed intentions were not relevant, they would not have added
the limitation as to interpretation since by so doing they implicitly
recognized that intent is otherwise pertinent as to the formation
of a contract. A relatively recent Federal case held that under
California law, to create a valid contract the minds of the parties
must meet and agree to the same thing.45 Since the language
used was similar to the applicable statutory language ("Consent is
not mutual, unless the parties all agree upon the same thing in the
same sense."46) this can be construed as a contrary interpretation
of this statute. In 1872, when this statute was enacted, the sub-
jective theory of contract formation was the rule rather than the
exception. Thus, it can be reasonably assumed that the legislature
intended this statutory section to express this theory. The ob-
jective theory has since become the predominant rule, however,
and courts have accordingly construed this statute as a codifica-
tion thereof. So, notwithstanding cases to the contrary, the major-
ity rule in California is the objective theory of contract. The land-
mark case in this area is Brant v. California Dairies, Inc.,47 and this
decision has been heavily followed.
48
In Smith v. Occidental Steamship Co., 49 the Supreme Court of
California outlined the law of contractual liability where one is
ignorant of the terms of the particular written contract.
The general rule is that when a person with the capacity of read-
ing and understanding an instrument signs it, he is, in the ab-
43. Id., see also CAL. Civ. CODE § 1636 (West 1973).
44. See, e.g., Leo. F. Piazza Paving Co. v. Bebek & Brkich, 141 Cal.
App. 2d 226, 296 P.2d 368 (1956).
45. Deering-Milliken Inc. v. Modern-Aire, 231 F.2d 623.
46. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1580 (West 1954).
47. 4 Cal. 2d 128, 48 P.2d 13 (1935).
48. See, e.g., Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aiknan Corp., 25 Cal.
App. 3d 987, 101 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1972), where the court held that one can
be bound to a contract as a result of his outward manifestations (conduct)
notwithstanding his lack of knowledge of all the terms.
49. 99 Cal. 462, 34 P. 84 (1893).
sence of fraud and imposition, bound by its contents, and is estopped
from saying that its provisions are contrary to his intentions or
understanding; but it is also a general rule that the assent of a
party to a contract is necessary in order that it be binding upon
him, and that, if the circumstances of a transaction are such that
he is not estopped from setting up his want of assent, he can be
relieved from the effect of his signature if it can be made to ap-
pear that he did not in reality assent to it.5o
It could be interpreted from the court's language that this gen-
eral rule would only seem to apply when a person had the capacity
to read, and even in such a case the court recognized that there
would be exceptions to one's being bound by a signed contract. It
is thus reasonable to imply that a less strict standard would apply
to a person unable to read, and this has been the interpretation
of the rule in California.
Therefore, notwithstanding the cases that hold a person is pre-
sumed to have assented to all the provisions of a writing which he
signs5 or that a person is presumed to have knowledge and under-
standing of the unambiguous language in a contract,52 exceptions
have evolved in California for persons illiterate or otherwise un-
able to read the contract.
In California, failure to have the contract read is not considered
negligence per se. 53 As in many other states,54 the issue as to negli-
gence is one for the trier of fact to resolve.55 If the failure to have
the document read to him is induced by or caused by the other party
to the contract, the duty of care imposed on the illiterate person
will necessarily be less.56 Furthermore, if the contents are mis-
read or misrepresented to the illiterate person by the opposing
party, the California rule does not require the showing of a confi-
dential relationship before an explanation as to his failure to have
it read by another will be allowed.57 This would seem to make the
presumption of assent and knowledge attributable to one signing a
contract a rebuttable one in California.
50. Id. at 470-71, 34 P. at 86-87 (emphasis added).
51. Eldridge v. Mowry, 24 Cal. App. 183, 140 P. 978 (1914).
52. Roller v. California Pacific Title Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 149,
206 P.2d 694 (1949).
53. CIT Corp. v. Panac, 25 Cal. 2d 547, 154 P.2d 710 (1946).
54. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 256 N.C. 468, 124 S.E.2d 130 (1962); Gaines
v. Jordan, 64 Wash. 2d 661, 393 P.2d 629 (1964); cf. Pimpinello v. Swift &
Co., 253 N.Y. 159, 170 N.E. 530 (1930) where failure of illiterate to procure
someone to read the instrument to him was held to be negligence as a
matter of law.
55. Wright v. Lowe, 140 Cal. App. 2d 891, 296 P.2d 34 (1956).
56. As to what is sufficient inducement, see text accompanying notes
92-94 infra.
57. Sidebotham v. Robison, 216 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1954).
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PART II
When someone, illiterate in English, has entered into a disad-
vantageous written contract, his counsel's first thought should be if
and how he can avoid liability. This article now discusses the var-
ious avenues open to him in pursuit of this objective.
Lack of Mutual Consent
When a person unfamiliar with the alien language of a contract
is fraudulently induced to sign without knowledge of its terms,
courts can and do void the contract on the basis of lack of mutual
consent.58 Because there are cases where the lack of mutual con-
sent has been used to defeat a contract in absence of fraud, cases
involving fraud will be discussed in the following section. Cases
dealing with the absence of fraud will be taken up at this juncture.
When one is confronted with a contract that he has entered into,
and fraud is not present, one line of attack is that no assent to the
contract exists since there was no knowledge or basic under-
standing of its terms. In Skym v. Weske Consolidated Co.,50 one
of the contracting parties could neither read nor write. A third
person, not a party to the contract, read the contract to the illiterate
and made "running comments" during the course of the reading.
After this, the writing was signed on behalf of the illiterate party.
The court held the contract void due to lack of mutual assent. The
explanation given by the court was that the person unable to read
had not meant to assent to the contract as actually written, but
to what he thought the contract contained, which included the
third party's comments during the reading.60
In Wetzstein v. Thomasson,61 the instrument was read verbatim
to the party unable to read by the other party. Even so, the court
held that there was not actual consent to the agreement because
there had been no explanation of the contract's full legal effect.
62
58. Mairo v. Yellow Cab Co., 208 Cal. 350, 281 P. 66 (1929).
59. 5 Cal. Unrep. 551, 47 P. 116 (1896).
60. Id. at -, 47 P. at 118.
61. 34 Cal. App. 2d 554, 93 P.2d 1028 (1939).
62. Id. at 559, 93 P.2d at 1036. An interesting question in regard to
this case is if the person could have read the contract and did so, but still
was not aware of the contract's full legal effect, would the court still have
held the instrument void?
In the case of Raynale v. Yellow Cab,63 an injured person was
submitted a liability release64 by a representative of the defendant.
Due to her injuries the plaintiff was not able to read, and all that
was discussed orally was damage to her coat. The court held that
notwithstanding the writing which purported to be a release from
all liability, the release only covered damage to the coat and did
not release defendant from liability for any personal injuries suf-
fered by the plaintiff. The court's basis for the ruling was that the
boundaries of mutual intent were limited to the discussion regard-
ing the coat.65
In both Skym and Wetzstein, the documents in question were
read to the illiterate party, so any negligence for failure to obtain
such a reading was not at issue. In Raynale, even though not
read, the document was discussed so the court could have followed
the principle that the person had a right to rely on representations
of the opposing party.0 In all three cases, the opposing party knew
of the other's inability to read the contract either because of illiter-
acy or injuries, and hence the estoppel principle had no application.
A landmark California case in this area of mutual assent is
Meyer v. Haas.67 Although Meyer did involve fraud and will be
discussed in the subsequent section, its importance requires an
examination of it at this time. In Meyer, the plaintiff was a Ger-
man who was unable to read English. The plaintiff signed an
agreement that purportedly released the defendant from all liability
for injuries suffered by plaintiff due to the defendant's negligence.
The release was not read to the plaintiff nor was he informed of its
contents. The plaintiff executed the agreement under the mistaken
belief, induced by the deception of the defendant, that the release
was only effective as to a claim he had for loss of time from em-
63. 115 Cal. App. 90, 300 P. 991 (1931).
64. Releases are to be treated the same as other contracts with respect
to mutual assent and rescission. Matthews v. Atchison Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry., 54 Cal. App. 2d 549, 129 P.2d 435 (1942). There are, however,
special rules applicable to releases executed for personal injuries unknown
at the time of the signing of the release. Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97,
378 P.2d 579, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1963). Briefly, the rule is that for release
of the unknown claim or claims to be binding, evidence must be produced
to show that the parties intended the release to have such effect. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1542 (West 1954). See also CAL. Civ. CODE § 1541 (West
1954) for the rule that a release can be valid absent new consideration if
the release is in writing. (It is also important to remember that a strong
public policy is prevalent in a release situation, thus, the courts will be
more motivated to find the contract void than if dealing with a normal
commercial transaction.)
65. 115 Cal. App. at 92, 300 P. at 991.
66. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra, 89-91 infra.
67. 126 Cal. 560, 58 P. 1042 (1899).
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ployment. The court held void the portion of the contract that re-
leased the defendant from all liability, but valid as to the claim for
loss of employment. In effect, the court's ruling was that Mr.
Meyer was bound to the agreement only to the extent that he had
intended to be.68
The court also ruled that the plaintiff would not have to return
any money received from the defendant for the reason ". .. that the
plaintiff in this case is not attempting to avoid a contract which
he has made, but is showing that he did not make the contract which
he apparently made."69 As will be discussed infra,7 ° a prerequisite
to rescission of a contract in California is a restoration of the con-
sideration received from the other party.71 In Meyer the contract
was not rescinded but held to be partially void ab initio, which did
away with the duty to comply with this requirement.
From these cases it is evident that if a person can avoid the estop-
pel and negligence problems a contract can be voided merely for
lack of mutual assent. To accomplish this it must be shown that he
was not negligent in failing to have the contract read or, in the
'alternative, that his negligence has not misled the other party.
Either of these situations would tend to furnish relief.72 It should
also be kept in mind that even where there is a reading of the con-
tract, under the right circumstances a court may still hold that
mutual assent is lacking.
Fraud
This discussion is limited to fraud in regard to the contents of a
writing-intrinsic fraud or fraud in the execution-and that does
not include fraud with reference to some collateral fact or promise
-extrinsic fraud or fraud in the inducement. The obvious reason
is that the inability to read is the sine qua non of misrepresenta-
tions of a writing's character or contents while collateral matters
can be fraudulently represented to learned 'as well as to illiterate
people. This article is only concerned with the former and their
68. Id. at 563, 58 P. at 1043.
69. Id.
70. See text at note 96, infra.
71. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1691 (West 1973).
72. Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17 CAm'.
L. REv. 441 (1929).
particular problems in the law of contracts. In fact, the courts
tend to limit the use of intrinsic fraud to avoid a contract to illiter-
ate persons since they are really the most susceptible ones to a
fraudulent misrepresentation of the contents of a writing.3
While ordinarily one is charged with knowledge of the terms of
a writing which he executes, there is an exception (in addition to
those already enumerated) where fraud 74 taints a material part of
the transaction. Therefore where one party induces the signature
of another by misrepresenting the contents of the writing, the de-
frauded party can avoid the contract if his reliance on the other
party was justified.7 5  This latter requirement is required to free
the illiterate person from a charge of negligence.
Avoidance of the contract, however, is only one of the remedies
open to a defrauded party. Instead of seeking rescission and repud-
iation of the contract, the defrauded party may elect to affirm the
contract and sue for damages in an action for deceit.7 6 Another
choice open is the use of the fraud as a defense in an action on the
written contract brought by the party guilty of the fraud.77 Refor-
mation of the contract would be another remedy available if the
parties had arrived at an oral agreement and due to the fraud of
73. Ford Motor Co. v. Pearson, 40 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1930).
74. "A fraudulent misrepresentation is one made with the knowledge
that it is or may be untrue, and with the intention that the person to
whom it is made act in reliance thereon." Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. 2d 409,
414, 115 P.2d 977, 980 (1941). There are two types of fraud, actual or
constructive, recognized by statute in California. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1571
(West 1954). CAL. CIv. CODE § 1572 (West 1954) defines actual fraud as
consisting
[i]n any of the following acts, committed by a party to the con-
tract, or with his connivance, with intent to deceive another party
thereto, or to induce him to enter into the contract:
1. The suggestion, as a fact of that which is not true, by one
who does not believe it to be true;
2. The positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the in-
formation of the person making it, of that which is not true,
though he believes it to be true;
3. The suppression of that which is true, by one having knowledge
or belief of the fact;
4. A promise made without any intention of performing it; or
5. Any other act fitted to deceive.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1573 (West 1954) defines constructive fraud as:
... Any breach of duty which, without an actually fraudulent in-
tent, gains an advantage to the person in fault, or anyone claiming
under him, by misleading another to his prejudice, or to the preju-
dice of anyone claiming under him; or,
2. . . . Any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be
fraudulent, without respect to actual fraud.
75. Security First Nat'l Bank v. Earp, 19 Cal. 2d 774, 122 P.2d 900
(1942). As to what constitutes justifiable reliance, see text accompanying
87-91 infra.
76. Paolini v. Sulprizio, 201 Cal. 683, 258 P. 380 (1927).
77. Id. This remedy has been termed "defensive relief."
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one of the parties the subsequent writing is inconsistent with the
prior oral agreement.
7 8
Regardless of which remedy is elected, the fraud must be shown
to exist by clear and convincing evidence.7 9 The presumption that
lies in favor of honesty and fair dealing necessitates the degree of
proof.80 However, where a confidential relationship exists be-
tween the parties, and an undue advantage has been gained by one,
then a presumption of fraud is said to exist,8 ' and would therefore
switch the burden of proof.
Rescinding8 2 or Voiding the Contract
As discussed supra,8 3 a person's inability to read does not ex-
cuse him from exercising due diligence with respect to written
agreements.8 4 Nevertheless, while it is a general rule that a person,
if unable to read a contract, is under a duty to obtain the services
of another to read it to him,8 5 the duty is excused where failure to
comply is a result of the other party's fraud.8 6
78. See 12 S. WILLISTON, supra note 10, at § 1525 (a).
79. Maslow v. Maslow, 117 Cal. App. 2d 237, 255 P.2d 65 (1953). This
requirement, however, is one for the trial court and not the court on
appeal. The appeals court will be governed by the general rule that if
the evidence is sufficient to support the finding the decision will not be
disturbed. Refinance Corp. v. Northern Lumber Sales, Inc., 163 Cal.
App. 2d 73, 329 P.2d 109 (1958). Note that this requirement of clear and
convincing evidence is not to be confused with a preponderance of the evi-
dence; the burden of proof required. Only a preponderance of evidence is
necessary to prove fraud, the additional burden of clear and convincing
evidence is necessary to overcome the presumption against fraud. Bell v.
Graham, 105 Cal. App. 2d 765, 234 P.2d 158 (1951), and see text accom-
panying notes 80-82 infra.
80. Shapiro v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States,
76 Cal. App. 2d 75, 172 P.2d 725 (1946).
81. Solon v. Lichtenstein, 39 Cal. 2d 75, 244 P.2d 907 (1952).
82. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1689 (West 1973) states in relevant part:
(b) A party to a contract may rescind the contract in the follow-
ing cases:
(1) If the consent of the party rescinding, or of any party jointly
contracting with him, was given by mistake, or obtained through
duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, exercised by or with the
connivance of the party as to whom he rescinds, or of any other
party to the contract jointly interested with such party.
83. See text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
84. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 50 Cal. 558 (1875).
85. Dale v. Dale, 87 Cal. App. 359, 262 P. 339 (1927).
86. Fleury v. Ramacciotti, 8 Cal. 2d 660, 67 P.2d 339 (1937).
In Gajanich v. Gregory, 7 this exception was described in the fol-
lowing manner:
It is the general rule that a person who executes a contract is
charged with knowledge of all its provisions where he had the
means of such knowledge and of which he negligently deprived
himself [citations omitted] and it has been held that the fact that
he is illiterate does not change the rule [citation omitted].
But where a fiduciary relation exists, and as a result a person is
fraudulently induced to execute a contract in the reasonable be-
lief that he is signing something else, a different rule applies and
the instrument is void ab initio [citation omitted]. The latter rule
has been applied in numerous instances where due to illiteracy or
a weak mental condition, persons who were unable to comprehend
the effect of their acts were induced to execute releases and other
contracts [citations omitted].88
The Gajanich court spoke of a "fiduciary relationship";8 9 however,
more recent cases have abrogated this requirement.9 0 This is not
to say that a justifiable right to rely on the representations is not
now required, but whether the right to rely is justified will depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case.91 Where the other
party is guilty of the fraudulent misrepresentation a right to rely
thereon is justifiable and relief is usually granted. The apparent
policy behind this rule would seem to be that where the other party
induces the defrauded one not to read the contract by misrepre-
senting the contents, it would be inconsistent to allow the fraudu-
lent party to use the illiterate's negligence as a bar to the latter's
relief.
A distinction can possibly be made as to whether the fraud was
the actual cause of failure to learn the contents or whether fraud
was simply present in the transaction. In Mazuran v. Stefanich,
9 2
it was held that where one signs a contract before ascertaining its
contents, because of the fraudulently induced belief that the terms
are different from those actually set out in the writing, the court
will void the transaction even in the absence of a confidential re-
lationship; while in Daily Telegram Co. v. Long Beach Press Pub-
lishing Co.,93 the court seemed to imply that the fraud itself must
be the cause when it said:
87. 116 Cal. App. 622, 3 P.2d 389 (1931).
88. Id. at 633, 3 P.2d at 393-94.
89. Fiduciary relationship which in law is synonymous with a confi-
dential relationship, exists ".... whenever trust and confidence is reposed
by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another." Stevens v. Marco,
147 Cal. App. 357, 372, 305 P.2d 669, 678 (1956).
90. See, e.g., 214 Cal. 619, 7 P.2d 297; Daily Telegram Co. v. Long Beach
Press Publishing Co., 133 Cal. App. 140, 23 P.2d 833 (1933).
91. California Trust Co. v. Cohn, 214 Cal. 619, 7 P.2d 297 (1932).
92. 95 Cal. App. 327, 272 P. 772 (1928).
93. 133 Cal. App. 140, 23 P.2d 833.
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A man may perhaps be able to discover for himself what he ought
to know if left to his own devices, but where he is induced by
the artifice of another not to use his opportunities it would seem
hardly fair that the one using the trick or misrepresentation should
remain protected.94
If the misrepresentations are to the contents then this would al-
ways be the inducing factor that produces the failure to ascertain
the true facts in the contract, and therefore the two cases can be
reconciled on this ground.
For a party to successfully attack a contract due to fraudulent
misrepresentations of its contents, there must of course be such
misrepresentations. Thus, where the opposing party does not rep-
resent the contents in any manner, in the absence of a duty to dis-
close, the other party could not rely on an action for fraud to have
the contract set aside.9 5 The obvious rationale is that if a miscon-
ception in this situation does exist, it can be attributed solely to
the other person's failure to have the contract read to him.
California has a statutory rule that requires a party to restore
any consideration as a prerequisite to that party's action to rescind
a contract.9 6 If reformation instead of rescission is sought, how-
ever, this requirement does not exist.
Reformation of the Contract
When a person has entered into a favorable oral agreement, but
the subsequent written agreement fails to accurately portray the
prior agreement, then he may want to reform the written instru-
ment in order to retain the fruits of his original bargain instead
of rescinding it. The California Civil Code permits reformation for
mutual mistake of the parties, unilateral mistake of which the other
party has knowledge, and fraud.97
94. Id. at 145, 23 P.2d at 835.
95. Muncy v. Thompson, 26 Cal. App. 634, 147 P. 1178 (1915).
96. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1691 (West 1973).
97. When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, or a
mistake of one party, which the other at the time knew or sus-
pected, a written contract does not truly express the intention of
the parties, it may be revised on the application of a party ag-
gieved, so as to express that intention, so far as it can be done
thout prejudice to rights acquired by third persons, in good
faith and for value.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3399 (West 1970).
The same general rule applies that if a person is negligent in
failing to have the contract read, reformation will be denied.98
Where the failure to ascertain the contents is caused by fraudulent
misrepresentations of the other party that the terms are different
from those actually embodied in the writing, the illiterate party is
not barred from relief by his negligence and the court will grant
reformation.9 No requirement of a confidential or fiduciary rela-
tion exists where reformation for fraud is sought.100 Before refor-
mation is granted the fraud must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence.101 There is a presumption that parties intend to make
an equitable agreement, and one seeking reformation is entitled to
the use of this presumption.102
It has been held that a void instrument is subject to neither refor-
mation'0 3 nor ratification.104 In order to determine what is re-
quired before a contract will be rendered void in California, an ex-
amination of applicable cases is necessary.
In Mairo v. Yellow Cab Co.,'0 5 the plaintiff, a Russian who was
unable to read English, had been injured by the defendant cab
company, and in an attempt to secure a release from liability the
defendant's representative employed a release written in English
which would release defendant from all liability in exchange for a
sum of money. The court, in reversing a directed verdict for the
defendant, held that if the true character of the release was mis-
represented to the plaintiff in such a manner that he did not in
actuality know what he was signing then it was void. 08 It should
be recognized that in this case the misrepresentation went to the
very nature of the instrument instead of its contents.
In Meyer v. Haas,07 the plaintiff signed a release under a mis-
conception as to its contents, thinking that the release was only for
lost time. Because of fraudulent misrepresentations by the defen-
dant's agent, he did not know that the writing was also a release of
all claims for personal injuries. The court held the release void,
98. Tomas v. Vaughn, 63 Cal. App. 2d 188, 146 P.2d 499 (1944).
99. Id. Note that the illiterate would not be considered negligent if he
had a right to rely on the representations of the other party.
100. Johnson v. Sun Realty Co., 138 Cal. App. 296, 32 P.2d 393 (1934).
101. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra.
102. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3400 (West 1970).
103. Douglass v. Dahm, 101 Cal. App. 2d 125, 224 P.2d 914 (1950).
104. Hakes Inv. Co. v. Lyons, 166 Cal. 557, 137 P. 911 (1913).
105. 208 Cal. 350, 281 P. 66 (1929).
106. Id. at 352, 281 P. at 67.
107. 126 CaL 560, 58 P. 1042; see also text accompanying notes 67-71
supra.
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and distinguished fraud in the factum from fraud in the execu-
tion.
In those cases generally the parties sought to avoid or rescind
contracts, the nature and contents of which they understood cor-
rectly, but they had been led to execute them by fraud or deception
as to something other than the contents of the contract; and in such
a case the contract would not be void but only voidable, and the
rule requiring a return of everything received on the faith of the
contract before it could be rescinded or avoided would apply; but
this rule as to a return of everything received does not apply
where a party is tricked or deceived into signing a contract different
in its terms and objects from the contract which he has made and
which he understands that he is executing. The contract under
such circumstances will be held to be what the maker of it intended
it should be, and not what it was made to appear to be by the de-
ception practices.' 08
A case that attempted to distinguish Meyer in relation to this
void/voidable distinction was Garcia v. California Truck Co.10 9
In Garcia the plaintiff was misled to believe that there was a pro-
vision in the release that promised him future employment as part
of the consideration. The court in holding the release voidable in-
stead of void said:
But the doctrine of Meyer v. Haas ..... has no application where
the party releasing thoroughly understood that the release he was
executing was what it purports to be, a release of the very cause
of action he seeks to enforce by action, notwithstanding a miscon-
ception on his part induced by fraud as to some other statements
in the writing."10
It would seem that if a person is misinformed as to certain state-
ments in the writing, the contract would be void not voidable, as
to these misconceived statements, and if material to the contract
the misrepresentation should render the entire agreement void.
Fraud in the execution, which renders a contract void, exists when
an instrument is signed under a mistaken belief as to its contents
or total identity due to fraud."' Section 1566 of the California
Civil Code, however, would seem to be a statutory attempt to
change this common law rule. This section states in pertinent
part:
108. Id. at 563, 58 P. at 1043.
109. 183 Cal. 767, 192 P. 708 (1920).
110. Id. at 770-71, 192 P. at 710.
111. See, Sweet, Promissory Fraud and the Parol Evidence Rule, 49
CALIF. L. REV. 877, 888 (1961).
A consent which is not free is nevertheless not absolutely void, but
may be rescinded by the parties, in the manner prescribed by the
Chapter on Rescission.112
As mentioned supra,"s the chapter of rescission contains a provi-
sion that requires a return of all consideration received as a pre-
requisite to rescission. If a person were unable to comply with this
then he would be relegated to an action for reformation or damages
due to deceit if the court did not hold the contract void. Moreover,
the Uniform Commerical Code's protection to a holder in due course
from personal defenses has no application when fraud-in the exe-
cution is present and the contract is held void." 4 It can be seen,
therefore, that it is important whether the court holds the contract
void or merely voidable.
Notwithstanding the statutory language of Section 1566, courts
have made the distinction between fraud in the inducement and
fraud in the execution, and have held contracts procured by the
latter void." 5 Fraud in the execution has been held to exist in
California where there is a misunderstanding as to the nature or
contents of the contract.1 6 Of course, holding the contract void
112. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1566 (West 1954).
113. See text at note 96 supra.
114. UNIFORM CoinvmRcrAL CODE § 3-305 states in pertinent part:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes
the instrument free from
(2) All defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the
holder has not dealt except
(c) Such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the
instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to
obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms .... (em-
phasis added).
See also CAL. Comm. CODE § 3305 (West 1964). This section clearly indi-
cates that misrepresentation of the essential terms of the instrument would
render it void so long as the illiterate party satisfies the other require-
ments outlined in this article, e.g. justifiable reliance. But cf. CAL. CIv.
CODE § 1804.2 (West 1973) which provides that:
[a]n assignee of the seller's rights is subject to all equities and de-
fenses of the buyer against the seller arising out of the sale and
existing in favor of the buyer at the time of the assignment, not-
withstanding an agreement to the contrary, but the assignee's lia-
bility may not exceed the amount of the debt owing to the as-
signee at the time that notice of equities and defenses is given to
the assignee.
This section would seem to deny holder in due course status to an assignee
of a retail installment sales contract, thereby rendering the distinction
between fraud in the execution or inducement and the void or voidable
nature of the resulting contract merely an academic question in these
situations. See Warren, Comments on Vasques v. Superior Court, 18
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1065 (1971) for a discussion of Section 1804.2.
115. 1 B. WITyI, SuivI1ARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 322 (8th ed. 1973).
116. City of Oakland v. California Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 573, 104 P.2d
30 (1940).
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can be disadvantageous as well as advantageous to the defrauded
party. If the contract is held void ab initio, he will not be required
to return the consideration received; however, neither will he be
allowed to ratify the contract and sue for damages for deceit be-
cause, as seen supra,117 a void contract cannot be ratified.
When the party signing the contract is held to be negligent in
failing to learn the contents of the writing prior to signing, the
Restatement of Contracts provides for the utilization of the void/
voidable distinction in a peculiar manner. The Restatement posi-
tion is that if one signs a contract under a mistake as to its con-
tents as a result of the fraud of the other party, the contract is void
unless the signer was negligent. If the latter situation is present,
the contract becomes merely voidable.118
The case of Security First-Nat'l Bank v. Earp"9 aptly demon-
strates the judicial confusion regarding this issue in California.
In Earp, the fraud involved went to the contents of the instrument;
i.e., fraud in the execution which should result in the instrument
being void. The defrauded party prayed for this relief and the trial
court granted it. However, on appeal the California Supreme Court,
while affirming, discussed rescission and the duty of restitution, ob-
viously not realizing that it is impossible to rescind a void instru-
ment! 20
This uncertainty in California can be resolved in a manner that
would conform to the common law rule, despite the statutory sec-
tion. The applicable statute, Section 1566 of the Civil Code, does
render a contract voidable rather than void when consent is not
freely given.' 2 ' For example, if a person was induced to sign a
contract through a misrepresentation of some collateral matter, the
consent is considered not freely given because induced by fraud.
Where the fraud, however, goes to the very contents or nature of
the written contract, there is in fact no consent given, free or other-
wise. Therefore, when the fraud prevents, due to lack of consent,
117. See text at note 104 supra.
118. RESTATEVmNT o CoTRncTs § 475, Illustration 2 (1932).
119. 19 Cal. 2d 774, 122 P.2d 900 (1942).
120. B. Wrrn, supra note 115, at § 686.
121. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1566 (West 1954); see text accompanying notes
111-112 supra.
a meeting of the minds, California Civil Code Section 1566 would
not be applicable and the contract should be held void.
Action for Deceit1
22
As can be seen, an action for deceit would be an important
remedy to a party who is in a position where rescission would not
afford adequate relief. For example, if a person were unable to
return what he had received as consideration he would be pre-
cluded from rescinding the contract, but he could still elect to af-
firm the contract, retain the consideration, and sue for damages
for deceit.
In the majority of jurisdictions, 123 the measure of damages in an
action for deceit is governed by the "benefit of the bargain" rule.
Under this rule the complaining party is entitled to recover the dif-
ference between the actual value of the property as received and
the value as represented.124 California, however, by statute lim-
its the measure of recovery to actual out-of-pocket damages suf-
fered by the plaintiff.125 This rule is appropriately named the
"out-of-pocket" rule, and recovery under it is the difference be-
tween the value parted with and the value that he has actually
received, plus any additional damage arising from the transac-
tion.12 6  This latter element clearly allows consequential dam-
age, 27 and if a fraudulent intent can be proved, exemplary dam-
ages are recoverable.
28
Notwithstanding this general California rule, in Morris v. Harbor
Boat Building Co.,12 9 the Second District Court of Appeal applied
122. The California Supreme Court has outlined the necessary elements
of action for deceit in the following manner:
In general, to establish a cause of action for fraud or deceit
plaintiff must prove that a material representation was made; that
it was false; that defendants knew it to be untrue or did not have
sufficient knowledge to warrant a belief that it was true; that it
was made with an intent to induce plaintiff to act in reliance
thereon; that plaintiff reasonably believed it to true; that it was
relied on by plaintiff; and that plaintiff suffered damage thereby.
Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 422, 159 P.2d 958, 964 (1945).
123. See W. PRossER, LAW or TonTs 734 (4th ed. 1971), and authorities
cited therein.
124. Id.
125. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343 (West Supp. 1973) (this section is limited
to fraud in the sale, purchase, or exchange of personal or real property.)
Note the measure of damages for fraud in a sale covered by the Uniform
Commercial Code would be the "benefit of the bargain" rule. CAL. Colmm.
CODE § 2721, CALIFO MA COMMENT 1 (West 1964).
126. Id.
127. Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).
128. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970).
129. 112 Cal. App. 2d 882, 247 P.2d 589 (1952).
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the benefit of the bargain rule and ruled the damages to be the
difference between what the buyer received and what he had the
right to expect to receive. 130 The Morris court also allowed the
introduction of parol evidence to establish the fraud and com-
mented:
Obviously, it would amount to a direct and complete contradiction
to affirm in one breath that a defrauded buyer has the legal right
to bring such an action, and then in the next breath to cancel such
remedy by quoting the parol evidence rule and excluding the only
type of evidence by which fraud could be established.1 31
The parol evidence rule ordinarily is not a problem when due to
fraud a contract is being challenged. The parol evidence rule is
simply a tool to prevent the introduction of oral evidence to con-
tradict or vary the terms of a written contract.132 Therefore, unless
a contract is valid and in effect, the parol evidence rule would not
apply, and evidence that goes to prove that consent has been ob-
tained by fraud or that no consent exists due to fraud, establishes
the invalidity of the contract. 33 Thus the parol evidence would
not be varying or contradicting the terms of the contract, since it
is proving that there is no contract in force to vary or contradict. 34
California's parol evidence rule is embodied in a statute which ex-
plicitly provides for the introduction of parol evidence to prove
fraud. 3
5
Even in the presence of this clear statutory language, courts in
California have constantly disagreed as to the admissibility of
parol evidence to show fraud. 36 The disagreement began with the
holding in Bank of America Natl Trust & Say. Assn. v. Pender-
grass. 37 In that case the court made the following distinctions
with respect to fraudulent promises: evidence of promises which
contradict or vary the terms of the writing were held to be inad-
missible even for the purpose of proving fraud; however, evidence
130. Id. at 889, 247 P.2d at 593. Note that this case was handed down
(1952) prior to adoption of § 2721 of the California Commercial Code
(1963), see note 125 supra.
131. Id.
132. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 238 (1932).
133. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF TE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 221 (1954).
134. Cobbs v. Cobbs, 53 Cal. App. 2d 780, 128 P.2d 373 (1942).
135. CAL. Cwv. PRO. CODE § 1856 (West 1955).
136. See Sweet, supra note 111, and cases cited therein.
137. 4 Cal. 2d 258, 48 P.2d 659 (1935).
of promises that were consistent with or which pertained to a mat-
ter not contained in the writing were held to be admissible to prove
fraud.1 38 This dubious distinction, though followed by many
courts,13 9 has received much criticism. 40 Regardless of the desir-
ability of the rule, how does its application affect persons who have
been fraudulently induced to enter into written contracts under
a mistaken belief that its terms are different than they actually
are?
It can be stated with reasonable certainty that the rule in Pen-
dergrass will not prevent these defrauded parties from utilizing
parol evidence as a means of proof. Several reasons can be ad-
vanced to justify this conclusion. First, in Fernald v. Lawsten,141
the court held that when execution of an instrument is procured
by fraud, proof of the fraud is always provable by parol evidence.
It is to be noted that this case was decided after Pendergrass,
which shows that Pendergrass is not uniformly followed in Cali-
fornia. Another reason is the distinction to be made between mis-
representations of existing facts, and the making of a fraudulent
promise.142 The rule in Pendergrass was held to apply only to
fraudulent promises, and when one is misled as to the contents of
a writing this would be classified as a misrepresentation of a mat-
erial fact, namely the contents of the writing. A case following
this line of reasoning and allowing the introduction of parol evi-
dence to show fraud when one party signed without reading the
instrument was Hamrick v. Acme Cigarette Service.1 43  In that
case one party was misled as to the contents of the writing, and
the court allowed parol evidence in to establish the fraud.
Adhesion Contracts and Unconscionability
When one is confronted with a situation where fraud is not prov-
able nor is a lack of mutual consent present, the doctrines of ad-
hesion contracts and unconscionability can be utilized.
138. Id. at 263, 48 P.2d at 662.
139. See, e.g., Simmons v. Cal. Institute of Technology, 34 Cal. 2d 264,
209 P.2d 581 (1949); Newmark v. H. & H. Products Mfg. Co., 128 Cal.
App. 2d 35, 274 P.2d 702 (1954).
140. See Sweet, supra note 111; Note, Parol Evidence: Admissibility to
Show that a Promise was Made without Intention to Perform it, 38 CALI.
L. REV. 535 (1950); Coast Bank v. Holmes, 19 Cal. App. 3d 581, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 30 (1971).
141. 26 Cal. App. 2d 552, 79 P.2d 742 (1938).
142. For purposes of this distinction, a fraudulent promise can be de-
fined as one made without any intention of performing it.
143. 164 Cal. App. 2d 340, 330 P.2d 419 (1958).
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If the person has entered into an adhesion contract, he will be
able to allege lack of mutual assent as determined under a different
standard than used where the contract terms are actually a pro-
duct of bargaining between the parties. Adhesion contracts have
been defined by the California Supreme Court as:
... [A] standardized contract prepared entirely by one party to
the transaction for the acceptance of the other; such a contract,
due to the disparity in bargaining power between the draftsman
and the second party, must be accepted or rejected by the second
party on a 'take it or leave it' basis, without opportunity for bar-
gaining and under such conditions that the 'adherer' cannot obtain
the desired product or service save by acquiescing in the form
agreement.144
Courts have become reluctant to enforce adhesion contracts, cit-
ing the policy that where one party signs a form document he
will very likely have little knowledge of its terms. 145 Thus his real
consent, or for that matter objective consent, will oftentimes be
absent.
When one contracting party who has drafted a long, complex con-
tract presents it to the other party for acceptance or refusal (for
adherence or non-adherence) he often is fully aware that the other
party has not read or bargained for many of the incidental terms
of the contract. In such a case, to conclude that the adheree is
bound by the form clause even though the other party knows he
has not read them is to reach a result which is hardly justified
on ordinary assent principles from the standpoint of either party to
the contract.'
4 6
A California court, recognizing this, has required a showing of "un-
derstanding consent" when a standardized adhesion contract is
sought to be enforced.
147
Closely related to adhesion contracts is the doctrine of uncon-
scionability. 48 Although California failed to adopt the Uniform
Commercial Code section 49 which dealt with this doctrine, 5 0 a
144. Steven v. Fidelity Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 882, 377 P.2d 284,
297, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 185 (1962).
145. A. CoRBIN, supra note 1, at § 107.
146. M. BENFriELD, NEW APPROACHES IN THE LAW OF CONTRACrS (1970).
147. Bauer v. Jackson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 358, 93 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1971).
148. An unconscionable contract has been defined as ". . . one such as
no man in his senses and not under a delusion would make on the one
hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other." Swanson
v. Hempstead, 64 Cal. App. 2d 681, 688, 149 P.2d 404, 407 (1944).
149. UNIFomv COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
judicial doctrine of unconscionability does exist in California.1 51
Additionally, there is statutory authority in California which pre-
vents the specific enforcement of contracts which are not just
and reasonable.
15 2
In a leading California case, Jacklich v. Baer, 53 the court applied
the equitable rule that contracts will not be specifically enforced
if they are so manifestly harsh and oppressive as to shock the con-
science. The court placed the burden on the party seeking specific
performance to affirmatively show that the contract was fair and
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time
it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscion-
able clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscion-
able clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract
or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its
commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making
the determination.
150. The California legislature, however, is at the time of this writing
considering amendments to Civil Code § 1770 which would outlaw "un-
conscionable acts and practices" in consumer transactions. The pertinent
statutory section and amendment reads in part:
The following unfair methods of competition and unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction
intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or
services to any consumer are unlawful:
(q) An unconscionable act or practice whether it occurs before,
during, or after the transaction. In determining whether an act or
practice is unconscionable, circumstances such as the following
shall be taken into consideration.
(1) Whether the seller has knowingly taken advantage of the in-
ability of the consumer reasonably to protect his interests because
of his physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, inabil-
ity to understand the language of an agreement or similar factors;
(2) Whether the seller knew at the time the consumer transaction
was entered into that the price was grossly in excess of the price
at which similar property or services were readily obtainable in
similar consumer transactions by like consumers;
(3) Whether the seller knew at the time the consumer transaction
was entered into of the inability of the consumer to receive a sub-
stantial benefit from the subject of the consumer transaction;
(4) Whether the seller knew at the time the consumer transac-
tion was entered into that there was no reasonable probability of
payment of the obligations in full by the consumer;
(5) Whether the seller required the consumer to enter into a
consumer transaction on terms the supplier knew were excessively
one-sided in favor of the seller;
(6) Whether the seller knowingly made a misleading statement
of opinion on which the consumer was likely to rely to his detri-
ment.
A.B. 918 (Meade) 1973 Sess. [emphasis added].
151. See Roos, The Doctrine of Unconscionability Alive and Well in
California, 9 CAnr. WEssaR L. REV. 100 (1972).
152. CAL. CIV. CoDs § 3391 (West 1970).
153. 57 Cal. App. 2d 684, 135 P.2d 179 (1943).
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just. Consequently, to obtain specific performance of a contract
in California, it must be alleged and proved that the contract is not
inequitable or unconscionable, and that the consideration is ade-
quatej 54 As with unconscionability under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code,155 the fairness of the contract is to be determined as of
the date of its making.156 Of course if specific performance is not
granted, the party can usually sue for breach of the contract, and
since specific performance is only available where there is no ade-
quate remedy at law' 57 a suit for breach will be utilized in most
cases. Thus the burden is on the other party to either attack or
defend the contract on one of the other grounds outlined in this
article.
Even though California has not adopted the "unconscionable"
section of the Uniform Commerical Code, a brief look at the section
and decisions in other states pursuant to it seems merited.
The importance of this doctrine is that it relieves one of the oner-
ous task of proving lack of mutual assent or fraud, and allows the
contract or a clause contained therein to be directly attacked on the
grounds that it is unduly harsh and oppressive, i.e., "unconscion-
able." Although many times a contract may be held unconscion-
able simply because it is just too harsh to one of the parties, many
other times the courts impliedly hold that there is more probably
than not fraud or lack of mutual assent present when they hold the
contract to be unconscionable.
No exact definition of unconscionability under the Code can be
articulated. 158 The official comments to the Uniform Commercial
Code, Section 2-302 speak of "oppression and unfair surprise." A
contract drafted in a foreign language to the non-drafting party
would clearly be classified as surprise, and courts do use surprise
as an indication of unconscionability. 59 To illustrate, as shown
154. Quan v. Kraseman, 84 Cal. App. 2d 550, 191 P.2d 16 (1948).
155. See note 149, supra.
156. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 22 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1927).
157. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3384 (West 1970); Wehen v. Lundgaard, 41 Cal.
App. 2d 610, 107 P.2d 491 (1940).
158. Assembly Bill 918 does attempt to define unconscionability by
mandating the consideration of particular circumstances when an attempt
is made to determine if an act or practice is unconscionable. See note
150, supra.
159. Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
931 (1969).
supra,10 courts do refuse to enforce contractual provisions solely
because one of the parties had no knowledge of it. It is also true
that the courts will refuse to enforce contractual provisions even
if known if to do so would result in an unconscionable result.161
It follows then that if a clause is unknown the court will be more
likely to hold it unconscionable than one that was fully dis-
closed.10 2
There are three cases' 63 that have specifically dealt with the issue
of a non-English speaking party, and have applied the unconscion-
ability doctrine. In Kabro Constr. Corp. v. Carire,6 4 the defendants
were being sued on a contract they had signed to have plaintiff
remodel their kitchen. Defendants were Spanish speaking and illit-
erate in the English language. The clause in dispute provided in
the event of any breach at any time, the plaintiff contractor could
recover 20 percent of the total cash price. The court held this not
to be a valid liquidated damages clause and that it was " ...
nothing more nor less than a device to allow the contractor to 'run
with the hares and bark with the hounds."', The court, in hold-
ing that the clause and entire contract were unconscionable and un-
enforceable, was of the opinion that the era of the application of the
doctrine of caveat emptor had vanished. The plaintiff argued that
if the court ruled the contract unenforceable, sellers would not
deal with non-English speaking people in fear of the same result
with their contracts. Even though this is a plausible argument,
the court dismissed it without comment as having no merit. 6
In Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso,167 a Spanish speaking buyer
negotiated orally in Spanish with a Spanish speaking salesman.
The contract was written in English, however, and was neither ex-
plained nor translated to the defendants. No defense of fraud was
alleged on behalf of the buyer. The court's finding was:
160. See text accompanying notes 60-67 supra.
161. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir. 1948).
162. M. BENFIELD, supra note 146.
163. An expanded discussion of the topic of unconscionability lies beyond
the reach of these pages. For more thorough coverage see Ellinghaus,
In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); Harrington, Un-
conscionabiiity Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 S. TEX. L.J. 203
(1967); Terry & Fauvre, The Unconscionability Offense, 4 GA. L. REV. 469
(1970) Note, Unconscionabality: Uniform Commercial Code SECTION 2-
302, 36 ALBANY L. REV. 114 (1971); Comment, The Uniform Commercial
Code's Solution for Unconscionable Contracts, 48 ORE. L. REV. 209 (1969).
164. POVERTY L. RPTR. 11642 (N.Y. Civ. 1970).
165. Id. at 11643.
166. Id. at 11644.
167. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966), rev'd on other grounds,
54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967).
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that the sale of the appliance at the price and terms indi-
cated in this contract is shocking to the conscience. The service
charge, which almost equals the price of the appliance is in and of
itself indicative of the oppression which was practiced on these de-
fendants. Defendants were handicapped by a lack of knowledge,
both as to the commercial situation and the nature and terms
of the contract-which was submitted in a language foreign to
them.1
68
Although the court mentioned oppression rather than unfair sur-
prise it is apparent that the court felt that defendants' language
barrier was an important factor in its holding.
In Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 69 the contract was printed
in English, and the defendant only read Spanish. The court was
doubtful if the defendant understood any of the terms in the print-
ed form contract. In holding the contract unconscionable the court
said:
The application of the doctrine of caveat emptor presupposes some
parity or equality between the bargaining parties. In the case at
bar there is no semblance of such parity. The defendant, Fran-
cisco Marcano, with whom the plaintiff's assignor conducted au its
business had at best a sketchy knowledge of the English language.
It can be stated with a fair degree of certainty that he neither knew
nor understood he had waived the implied warranty of merchant-
ability and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
despite the fact that those waivers are printed in large black type
in the contract. It is likewise impossible to assume he knew or
understood that he agreed not to set up any claims, defenses, coun-
terclaims, setoffs or cross complaints in any action brought by the
assignee of the contract.
170
The court correctly recognized that the defendant did not consent
either subjectively nor objectively to all the terms of the contract.
In view of this the court could have possibly nullified the agree-
ment without resort to the doctrine of unconscionability.
Although freedom of contract has been considered a most cher-
ished right of individual liberty, its use has been abused. Where
a purchaser is left with a take it or leave it proposition due to a
disparity of bargaining power or where one has a position of bar-
gaining power over another because of the latter's inability to read,
there is no real freedom of contract present. The bargain element
of contract is absent in both situations, and this is an open invita-
168. Id. at 27, 274 N.Y.S.2d 759 (emphasis added).
169. 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1969).
170. Id. at 140-41, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 393-94.
tion to a clear possibility of serious injustice. 171  The California
Legislature has recently acted in an attempt to help alleviate the
possibility of abuse in the latter situation. The 1973 session of the
legislature amended Civil Code sections 1689.5 through 1689.13
to require that in home solicitation contracts, the contract, as well
as notification of the right to cancel such a contract, be written in
the same language as is principally used in the sales presentation.172
This is truly a step in the right direction, and one it is hoped that
the courts will soon follow.
DWIGHT PRESTON
171. For an interesting discussion dealing with this consent problem and
failure to read the contract in Great Britain see Spencer, Signature, Con-
sent, and the Rule in I/Estrange v. Graucob, 32 CAwm. L.J. 104 (1973).
172. Assembly Bill No. 1175, introduced by Assemblyman Fenton, was
approved by the Governor on September 17, 1973. This act revises the law
of home solicitation contracts in numerous ways. Especially pertinent to
this article is section 3 which reads in relevant part:
(a) In a home solicitation contract or offer the buyer's agreement
or offer to purchase shall be written in the same language, e.g.,
Spanish, as principally used in the oral sales presentation....
The act provides that if the seller fails to comply with section 3 the
buyer may cancel the contract.
